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The development of Highly Automated Vehicles 
(HAVs) capable of performing SAE Level 4 
autonomous driving (AD) is a huge attractor of 
intellectual and capital investment across the 
world today. No single company has developed a 
complete system of hardware and software that 
can realistically be deployed in unconstrained 
urban environments yet, but several teams 
expect to attain a standard that they consider 
should be deployable in our cities within 3-5 
years, perhaps sooner in simple, wide, well-lit 
and sparse urban zones.  
If we are able to deploy such systems, they 
have the potential to unlock major economic 
and societal benefi ts for city dwellers and our 
economies as whole: the means to offer low 
cost universal demand-responsive mobility to 
every citizen, a tool for unlocking unproductive 
commuting time and enabling economic 
engagement for everyone, increased road 
safety for all road users and materially lower 
pollution, congestion and resources today 
wasted in manufacturing, assembling, parking 
and disposing of personal vehicles. In delivering 
safe, on-demand, shared end-to-end journeys 
across a city, including zero occupancy dispatch, 
the advent of HAVs will presage an inevitable 
and dramatic shift away from the car ownership 
model which has prevailed for over 100 years 
towards a low cost, shared mobility-as-a-service 
world which can integrate more successfully 
with shared public transport services.
Reaching that goal is requiring large teams of 
computer scientists, mathematicians, engineers, 
roboticists and manufacturers to work together 
across disciplines to meet many engineering 
and implementation challenges. These are 
highly complex technologies which must be 
built using commercially feasible hardware and 
by selecting, hardening and integrating many 
recent, and still being developed, cutting-edge 
research breakthroughs from academia. Not 
only must those teams themselves test and 
validate the resulting systems to ensure they 
do not cause injury or death to humans and 
animals or endanger property, the public as a 
whole – along with their elected representatives 
– need the reassurance of a clear and rational 
means to validate the safety of these systems 
independently through an appropriate regime of 
validation and a process of certifi cation. 
What is already clear is that the combinatorial 
effects of different road topologies, road users, 
appearances, lighting, weather, behaviors, 
sensors, seasons, velocities, randomness 
and deliberate actions cannot be adequately 
experienced in on-road testing alone, even in the 
constrained operational design domain (ODD)1 
constraints implied by level 4 autonomy. And if 
they could, it would take billions of highly varied 
miles of drive testing on each individual build of 
hardware and software to reach a statistically 
reliable level of validation that the proposed 
system could even attain human levels of safety. 
The stakes are high: even a single bad character 
in one line of software code can, and has, 
caused catastrophic failure. Any such failures 
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with more wide-sweeping legislative reform 
targeted thereafter. 
While nobody should expect these systems 
to be perfect, we should expect them to 
reach human driver safety levels and to 
be progressively tightened to signifi cantly 
higher safety levels over time. In that quest, 
it’s important that development and testing 
practices are established, are followed and 
that developers and regulators can measure 
the safety performance of each combination of 
technologies in representative environments to a 
statistically meaningful standard.
This paper therefore seeks to explore the 
problem space, propose appropriate practices 
and contribute to the establishment of a 
certifi cation regime that will safely unlock the 
value of HAVs to our citizens.
Safety Objective
Once human levels of safety have been attained 
and surpassed, a primary objective for any HAV 
program should be to reduce the incidence of 
injury to humans, animals and property. 
The UK’s Department for Transport reported that 
in 2016, 327 billion vehicle miles were driven 
in the UK and there were 137,000 ‘accidents’ 
reported to the police which are essentially 
collisions reported to insurance companies. 
That equates to one reported ‘accident’ every 
2.4 million driven miles, with reported serious 
injury occurring every 12.6 million driven miles. 
found in testing would require build change with 
the potential for regressive effects meaning that 
the testing process would need to start again. 
This means that a methodology that rests solely, 
or mainly, on on-road testing is infeasible.  
Although international and national standards 
exist for the functional safety of individual 
components and sub-systems (e.g. ISO 26262), 
no regulatory authority today has a well-defi ned 
system for validation of HAVs as a complete 
system rooted in an understanding of the 
problem space. For example, measures set out 
by California’s Department for Motor Vehicles 
(DMV) include the reporting of ‘driven miles 
per disengagement’ and this is sometimes 
presumed as a competitive measure of maturity 
and safety of proposed systems. Not only can 
these measures be statistically meaningless2 – 
only a tiny fraction of the potential state space 
has been explored – but they are potentially 
harmful in encouraging premature and non-
representative on-road testing, discouraging 
interventions and propagating a misleading 
perspective on safety, leading to loss of life. Our 
opportunity is to set out a framework and ensure 
our testing and validation processes are world-
leading, thereby ensuring safety for our citizens, 
gaining economic advantage fi rst and unlocking 
global business opportunity for our scientifi c and 
engineering companies who embrace the regime.
In light of the perceived benefi ts from HAVs, 
the UK government has indicated a willingness 
to provide an exemption from (or modifi cation 
to) the construction and use regulations so that 
they can be used on public roads before 2021, 
Not all incidents are police-reported ‘accidents’ 
and collisions are likely to be signifi cantly more 
frequent than the reported statistics indicate. 
The number of motor insurance claims in 2016 
was 4.34 million3, or one claim every 75,000 
driven miles and many accidents are not 
reported to insurers. 
The Institute of Advanced Motorists in their 
‘Licensed to Skill’ report in 2010 estimated that 
around 94% of these incidents can be traced 
directly to human error but, in terms of public 
acceptance, HAVs that cause human injury or 
death are likely to be held to a higher standard 
than fellow humans, however irrational that 
may be. We do not know exactly how much 
higher these standards will need to be, but it 
seems likely that in order for the general public 
to accept the relinquishing of control to these 
emerging autonomous systems, halving the 
collision rate would be a minimum target. And 
that implies an incident rate of around once per 
200,000 miles.
If the above were achieved, HAVs could halve 
serious injury and death on our roads, saving 
over a thousand lives each year in the UK alone, 
most in the 15-29 age bracket. The societal 
benefi t is an overwhelming one.
Regulatory Context
Regulations governing the standards, testing and 
certifi cation of product conformity of vehicles 
on public roads in Europe are governed by 
European Union (EU) Directives and, by virtue 
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of the fact that the EU is a contracting party to 
global technical regulations coordinated by the 
United Nations (UN), are also governed by safety 
and environmental aspects of UN regulations 
too. The UN regulations are managed by the 
World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle 
Regulations, a permanent working party of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE). UNECE and EU countries take part in 
the technical preparatory work of the Forum and 
UNECE exercises the right to vote in the Forum 
on behalf of the EU.
Directive 2007/46/EC provides that EU countries 
share a common legal framework and general 
technical requirements for the approval of 
new vehicles and of systems, components and 
technical units designed for them. It establishes 
a harmonized framework so as to facilitate the 
registration, sale and entry into service of new 
vehicles anywhere in the EU, as well as rules 
regarding the sale and entry into service of 
vehicle parts and equipment. 
For vehicles to be approved for registration, 
sale and entry into service, the ‘whole vehicle’ 
must pass all applicable approvals and, for this 
purpose, a single production sample is selected 
and tested as representative of the type to be 
approved, hence the term Type Approval. In 
order to gain whole vehicle Type Approval, each 
of the various systems, e.g. brakes, emissions, 
noise, etc., must be tested and meet the 
standards set out in the relevant EU Directives 
and UNECE regulations. There are no additional 
whole vehicle tests; instead the sample vehicle 
will be considered as a whole by a designated 
approval body and if the production sample of 
the complete vehicle can be confi rmed to match 
the specifi cations contained in all the separate 
Directive approvals, then on submission of the 
relevant manufacturer’s information documents, 
it will result in the issue of a European Whole 
Vehicle Type Approval Certifi cate (EWVTA).
EU Regulations permit any EU Member State 
to appoint an Approval Authority to issue 
those EWVTAs and to appoint a Technical 
Service to carry out the testing to the EU 
Directives and Regulations standards. In the 
UK, both the Approval Authority and Technical 
Service functions are performed by the Vehicle 
Certifi cation Agency (VCA).
No technical Directive yet exists for the approval 
of HAVs. Moreover, existing Directives sometimes 
confl ict with such operation: one example being 
the UNECE regulation no 79 on steering type 
approval which places an effective 12km/h limit 
on HAVs through clause 5.1.6.1 which states that 
‘Automatically Commanded Steering …. action 
shall be automatically disabled if the vehicle 
speed exceeds the set limit of 10 km/h by more 
than 20 per cent’.
Several working groups have been established 
to seek consensus on how UNECE and EU 
Directives should be amended to permit HAV 
operation.
Objective of this Paper
The objective of this paper is not to identify 
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confl icts within the existing Type Approval 
process or suggest amendments to the existing 
Directives – this work is already underway 
through the various working groups – but to 
identify the key components of a validation, 
verifi cation and certifi cation process for HAVs 
that could be adopted to ensure their safe 
introduction on UK and European roads, along 
with highlighting the open research questions in 
relation to that process.
Until now, there have been no universally 
accepted dividing lines between validation 
(which checks that the required specifi cation 
is complete and accurate), verifi cation (which 
is the process used to gain confi dence in the 
correctness of a design or system with respect 
to its specifi cation) and certifi cation (which is 
the legal recognition by a certifi cation authority 
that a product or service complies with the 
requirements).  
This paper therefore proposes the following 
approach:
• To propose a target general framework, to be 
achieved over time, which is capable of being 
applied to the discovery and establishment 
of adequate specifi cations for HAVs, which 
defi nes a process for validating those 
specifi cations (including safety properties) 
and which establishes a means of verifying 
that any candidate System under Test (SUT) 
is robust to all major classes of defects 
against those validated specifi cations to a 
measurable standard. This will permit HAV 
technology developers to attain and, over 
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time, exceed human levels of driver safety
• To establish that framework as a code of 
practice that the UK (and by extension, if 
adopted, the EU) will require HAV technology 
developers to internally adopt for V&V, if 
they want to deploy in those regulatory 
environments
• To require that the UK (and by extension, if 
adopted, the EU) certifi cation authorities 
adopt the same framework to independently 
verify a randomized subset of the design 
verifi cation
• To require certifi cation authorities (or an 
approval body) to conduct an audit of the 
quality assurance (QA) processes of the 
HAV technology vendor to ensure that the 
design and test methodology they employ is 
rigorous
• To require that there is a process whereby 
HAV technology developer software updates 
remain robust to regressions and conform to 
specifi cations as they are updated
This paper is structured in the above order, fi rst 
identifying the key attributes of a V&V framework 
for HAVs and then discussing how this may be 
applied in the context of certifi cation.





To ensure a HAV validation framework can 
establish and measure performance against 
necessary safety standards, it must address at 
least fi ve types of defects. These are intended to 
cover all types of potential faults in the system, 
its environment or its use:
 Requirements defect: the system is specifi ed 
to do the wrong thing (defect) or is not 
required to do the right thing (gap) or the 
Operational Design Domain (ODD) description 
is incomplete (gap) or inaccurate (i.e. a 
validation defect). These types of defects 
may manifest as product defects where the 
system does something unsafe or as process 
defects, i.e. where there is insuffi cient 
evidence of safety  
 Design defect: the system design fails to 
meet a specifi ed safety and/or functional 
requirement or fails to respond properly to 
violations of the defi ned ODD
 Implementation defect: the implementation 
of the system does not conform to its design 
specifi cation
 Verifi cation plan defect: the verifi cation 
plan fails to exercise potential states 
(e.g. corner cases) in requirements or to 
identify instances in which the vehicle’s 
interpretation of the external world is 
incorrect to the degree that safety is 
impaired
 Safety or reliability defect: an invalid input or 
a corrupted system state causes an unsafe 
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system behavior or failure (e.g. sensor noise, 
component fault, software defect) or an 
excursion beyond the ODD due to external 
forces
HAV Requirements
A key challenge for the safety assurance of HAVs 
is in understanding the system requirements and 
validating that they suffi ciently represent the 
ODD before verifi cation of the system against 
those requirements can begin.
Vehicle Road Testing for Requirements 
Discovery
Discovering the system requirements for HAVs 
in a target ODD is a huge and necessarily 
incomplete task, partly because the real world 
has high dimensionality and combination 
possibilities – objects, environment, behaviours, 
degradations, sensors, occlusions and so on 
– but also because the process of discovering 
precisely what is needed is never fi nished as the 
real world keeps changing.   
Since no digital record exists anywhere that 
does or could possibly describe all the possible 
stand-alone and combinatorial possibilities that 
might exist in anything other than the simplest 
ODD the HAV could be presented with, any 
system specifi cation will inevitably still present 
gaps to the real requirements.
Minimizing those requirement gaps is the 
primary motivation for on-road vehicle data-
gathering and testing operations. These include:
• Detecting novel road hazards
• Detecting lighting, weather, specularities, 
sensor combinatorial failures in the ODD 
• Discovering behaviors that violate normal 
traffi c rules and fi nding exceptional but 
possible scenarios
• Learning accepted norms of driving
• Discovering unusual road user confi gurations, 
surfaces, aesthetics and behaviours
• Discovering how behaviours vary by time of 
day, weather, season
• Finding situations where sensing modalities 
fail, localization exhibits randomness or 
biases
• Finding and correcting misleading but well-
formed map data
• Discovering types of novel road signs and 
traffi c management mechanisms specifi c to 
a micro-location or event
• Finding unusual road markings and 
vandalism, degradations, mistakes
• Learning emergent traffi c effects caused by 
the HAV and learning third-party behaviors 
due to the presence of the HAV
• Learning malicious third-party behaviors
Once a discovered requirement is identifi ed 
by vehicle testing in the ODD and validated 
(distinct from an SUT verifi cation failure against 
an existing system specifi cation), there should 
be an update to the system requirements for 
that ODD, an update to the requirements for 
the fi delity of the simulation environment, the 
generation of one or more new test cases or a 
combination of all three.
The larger the ODD, the longer and more 
expensive the requirements discovery process 
will be. It is for this reason, amongst others, that 
we are a long way away from a true SAE level 5 
autonomous driving capability.
Hazard Analysis
While real-world discovery of requirements 
is an essential part of requirements capture,  
systems engineering methods like STPA (Systems 
Theoretic Process Analysis developed by MIT) 
or Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) should also 
be adopted to better understand where defects 
of any kind can lead to hazards. STPA has been 
used in the aviation industry by Boeing, Embraer 
and NASA.
Encoding Scenario Requirements
Efforts are underway in various countries to 
document the HAV’s requirements as a curated 
set of vehicle behaviours and scenarios, the 
largest being the Project for the Establishment 
of Generally Accepted quality criteria, tools and 
methods as well as Scenarios and Situations 
for the release of highly-automated driving 
functions supported by Germany’s Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (the 
Pegasus project).4
The capture and curation of such scenarios 
and behaviours provides a means not just to 
specify system performance but to develop 
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and verify functionality that attempts to meet 
those system specifi cations. Such scenarios 
and behaviors can also be used to generate 
regression tests which can be replayed in 
simulated worlds to play a part in verifying some 
aspects of the behavior of an entire system-
under-test (SUT), as well as to provide a baseline 
from which to randomize variables to discover 
new failure modes of the SUT.
The Pegasus project, which has gained the 
broad support of many major participants in 
the German automotive industry, has the aim 
of developing procedures for the testing of 
AD functions, in order to facilitate the rapid 
implementation of HAVs into practice.
Scenarios are a key element of the Pegasus 
verifi cation concept in that they are the basis 
for eliciting whether the HAV under test exhibits 
appropriately safe system-level behaviours. 
Scenarios have a functional view (described in 
free text), a logical view (with a set of ranges for 
the “interesting variables”), and a concrete view 
(with all these variables given concrete values).
Pegasus scenarios can be captured in a number 
of different ways but since the whole project 
is still at an early stage, today there is just one 
live capture method, OpenSCENARIO. This is an 
XML-based format proposed by Vires Simulations 
Technologie GmbH and capable of being 
interpreted on Virtual Test Drive, a widely-used 
simulation platform Vires has developed and 
marketed. OpenSCENARIO is therefore currently 
being adopted by all participants in Pegasus as 
a pro tem standard for capturing concrete test 
cases. Longer-term, the Pegasus project hopes 
that OpenSCENARIO might evolve to become 
a cross-platform industry-wide standard for 
encoding scenarios and behaviors that could 
be ported to many or all simulation and testing 
execution platforms (including software-in-
the-loop simulators, hardware-in-the-loop 
simulators and test track setups).
Behaviour Requirements
Encoding such scenarios and confi rming the 
ability of the SUT to perform a manoeuvre that 
avoids collision in testing against each scenario 
has limitations unless we can also verify whether 
the SUT can conform to traffi c laws and to 
driving codes of practice during that testing.
 
Encoding Traffi c Law & Driving Behaviors
For that, we need a publicly-available, machine-
readable and complete set of those traffi c laws 
and driving codes and conventions, a Digital 
Highway Code (DHC). That DHC must include 
exception handling rules, for example: when and 
how exactly can a vehicle cross a centre dividing 
line, if present, to avoid a lane obstruction; when 
would it be acceptable to mount a sidewalk; 
what should a driver be permitted to do if 
traffi c lights are defective and so on. These 
conventions should extend to polite behavior 
on the road in that jurisdiction, including when 
a HAV should let other road users merge into 
its lane, to what extent does the HAV have a 
responsibility to ensure the most effi cient use of 
the road network, etc.
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Simulation as a Tool for 
Verifi cation
The core of any effective verifi cation program for 
HAVs will be the use of simulation.  
One or more simulators must be developed to 
be capable of replaying scenarios in which the 
road, lighting, weather, degradations, objects, 
road user actions and interactions can be re-
generated and used for verifying the SUT. How 
complete and representative of the real world a 
simulator needs to be depends on which parts 
of the SUT stack is being exercised and tested 
and how much testing is necessary to explore 
the state space. But at some level, the full SUT 
stack must be tested, which means that photo-
realism, radar and Lidar refl ectivity, sensor 
models, vehicle dynamics, road surface, human 
actions must be model variables on top of a 
baseline simulation capability. A critical issue is 
how good these simulations must be in order to 
be effective verifi cation tools, when considered 
in conjunction with other verifi cation methods 
including lab test, real-world driving, etc.
Components
An example of the principal components of a 
simulation model suitable for HAV verifi cation is 
shown in fi gure 1.
 
Figure 1: Example simulation model to support HAV verifi cation
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Scenario Replay
The base point for using a simulator is the 
interpretation of a scenario and its re-creation 
in a simulated world, including the instantiation 
of all recorded dynamic agents and behaviours 
captured in that scenario. Given a model of road, 
layout, obstacles, occlusions, road users and 
behaviours, a simulator can test the predictive 
capability of the SUT stack, test its ability to 
plan the HAV motion in the context of road 
rules and uncertainties, set a trajectory and 
control the HAV safely, given a model of the HAV 
vehicle dynamics. A noise model is used to inject 
perception stack uncertainty into measurements 
and, at a base level, testing would confi rm safe 
operation given that scenario and noise. Such 
behavioural tests could run much faster than 
real-time since the perception layers of the 
stack would be replaced with noise models. 
Types of noise as well as scene and user 
behaviours are varied to discover new failure 
modes in a process sometimes referred
to as ‘fuzzing’.
Coverage Driven Verifi cation
In addition, simulation models can also be 
generative in the construction of new scenarios 
that are theoretically possible but have not yet 
been captured in road testing or in manual test 
case generation. Generative models allow the 
exploration of state space beyond fuzzing, either 
on a random or directed basis. Several useful 
techniques exist for exploring and fi nding new 
failure modes. These include (i) coverage metrics 
which then can direct random test generation 
to broaden that coverage and (ii) using machine 
learning to reward fi nding new combinations of 
layouts, objects, behaviors, velocities, lighting, 
weather, season etc. that cause the SUT to 
fail using the proximity of close or actual test 
failures from random test generation. These 
types of verifi cation are usually referred to a 
coverage driven verifi cation. Since the state 
space being explored for HAVs is extremely large, 
to all intents and purposes infi nite, coverage 
driven verifi cation using generative modelling 
would emphasize exploration over density of 
test coverage which would, by defi nition,
remain sparse.
Randomization & Direction
Hand-written tests can be created by focusing 
on expected corner cases and then automatically 
‘fuzzing’ around them. This involves human 
generation of very general abstract scenarios 
which are then instantiated into many different 
concrete scenarios and coverage is typically 
clustered around these corner cases.
Another approach, currently favored by the 
Pegasus project, is to use randomization with 
expected distributions, often referred to as 
Monte Carlo simulation. This approach provides 
sparse coverage but will deliver estimates of the 
frequency of failures.
But directed or machine-learning randomization 
is the favored method for defect-fi nding. These 
techniques emphasize the capability to reach 
edge cases, at the expense of overall failure rate 
estimation and can also be used to support the 
systematic discovery of defects with respect to 
adversarial perturbations.5 
It is important to note that the statistical 
distribution of test cases has to be driven 
both by the probability of occurrence and the 
magnitude of a potential loss (i.e., by risk, not 
just occurrence). Otherwise a relatively rare 
scenario that could result in a fatality will 
be under-represented. In other words, while 
some testing should concentrate on normal 
functionality, a substantial portion of testing will 
need to emphasize infrequent but
dangerous situations.
Verifi cation in Digital Twins
As well as fuzzed scenario replay and the use 
of coverage driven verifi cation in generative 
models, simulation models can also be built 
that replicate the real world ODD and the likely 
object types and behaviours in it. Applying 
coverage driven verifi cation to such digital 
twins will fi nd additional failure modes which 
may not be found in fuzzed test scenarios nor 
easily found in fully-generative models. It can 
also provide a higher level of coverage that, to 
some extent, is measurable in relation to the 
real-world twin the digital model represents. 
This approach is therefore an extremely useful 
addition to the fi rst two techniques but requires 
the creation of a ‘digital twin’: literally a realistic 
model of the ODD along with a distribution 
of dynamic agents and behaviours that are 
representative, in absolute terms, of that 
specifi c ODD.
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Full Stack as well as Motion Planning
Not only must the predictive, behavioural and 
control aspects of the HAV stack be tested 
in simulation (motion planning) but the full 
stack must be tested too, since many failure 
modes are possible in the sensors, localization, 
perception, interpretation, classifi cation and 
confi dence measurement layers of the stack 
alone, or as they interact with the motion 
planning layers as a whole. 
Full stack testing is a bigger task than 
behavioural testing, since the simulation model 
must now render the scene with photorealistic 
textures, lighting effects, refl ections, 
specularities, shadows, weather and seasons. 
The same is true for all road users, pedestrians, 
cyclists and any other objects in the scene, and 
a library of such objects must be curated and 
maintained. Sensor outputs need to be modelled 
based on the placement of the sensors on the 
HAV and on accurate models of the behavior 
of those sensors, including any dynamic range 
limitations, calibration limitations or errors, 
quantization, timing delays, race effects, color 
and lighting sensitivities, blur and other optical 
perturbations. And it’s not just RGB that needs 
rendering, it’s also radar, Lidar and other sensing 
outputs, given material, density, weather and 
other conditions. A useful contribution here 
may also come from the Pegasus project, in the 
shape of the proposed standard for defi ning 
weather, signs, sensor inputs and so on, called 
Open Simulator Interface (OSI). OSI could be 
used in the future to connect various simulated 
artefacts produced by different companies.
Not surprisingly, full stack testing is 
computationally expensive and may run 
well below real-time, meaning that attaining 
meaningful levels of coverage will require 
substantial datacenter resources to spin up 
multiple instances of the simulator, sensors and 
the SUT.
Useful Tools and Methods
A Scenario Language
A well-defi ned language to describe scenarios 
that can be interpreted by each simulator to 
re-create essentially the same scenario and 
behaviours with high fi delity is likely needed. 
Perhaps OpenSCENARIO is such a language, 
but if is not suitable a new one will need to be 
created. One such initiative is being pioneered 
by Foretellix, an Israeli startup, and they simply 
call this language Scenario Description Language 
or SDL. But whether it is OpenSCENARIO, SDL or 
something different, a cross-industry agreement 
must be reached.
A Scenario Sharing Library
A library of scenario test cases must be 
developed by or made available to each 
company building HAV technology. Of course, 
it needs to be as comprehensive as possible in 
many dimensions. 
A suitable scenario library should:
• Cover cases where collisions are possible 
and must prove SUT avoidance within the 
boundaries of the DHC
• Monitor and report behaviour before, during 
and after collisions or near-collisions
• Pay specifi c attention to interactions 
between HAVs and humans and grade for 
collisions, near collisions, breaches of the 
DHC and any other behaviours where the SUT 
adversely affected any virtual passengers, 
traffi c fl ow or other road users
• Emphasize the verifi cation of inference or 
deep neural network-based algorithms and 
fi nd failure cases where interpretability is 
poor
• Use (i) replayed scenarios (ii) fuzzed replayed 
scenarios (iii) generative models with 
directed or machine-learning randomization 
and (iv) replayed, fuzzed and generative 
behaviors in a digital twin of representative 
(or whole) digital twin instantiations of target 
ODDs
• Look for both “expected” and “unexpected” 
defects 
• Employ confi guration fi les that permit 
portability from city-to-city through tractable 
modifi cation of vehicle, sensors, weather 
fi les, location, signage, human behaviours, 
road markings and DHC
These objectives must be met whilst maintaining 
transparency and maintainability.  As the number 
of test scenarios grows and as they become ever 
more intricate, this will become a real problem 
unless tackled from the outset by the industry 
in initiatives, like the Pegasus project or by the 
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adoption by several key players of a succinct 
means of encoding those scenarios.
A Motion Language
A motion language with qualitative actions (e.g. 
“follow at a safe distance” or “pull in safely”) 
could add signifi cant value to the validation and 
verifi cation processes. In the UK, learner drivers 
are tested on their knowledge of the Highway 
Code and advanced motorists are encouraged 
to follow the guidance set out in Roadcraft: The 
Police Driver’s Handbook. 
Codifying what constitutes good driving as 
described in these manuals, as in the suggested 
DHC can serve the following uses:
• Engage with the public on target HAV 
behaviours on UK roads
• Complement scenario-based, coverage 
driven system testing
• Provide the basis behaviour for a test oracle
• Provide the basis functionality for low 
complexity monitoring systems to be used 
by HAVs in run time to improve safety 
robustness.6
Model-checking using a formal method might be 
used to automatically verify safety properties of 
the DHC using observation of behaviours from 
the real world.
Application of Formal Methods
Important aspects of hardware design are 
already amenable to automated proof methods, 
making formal verifi cation possible to introduce. 
But the application of these methods to 
software design is a more complex problem, 
although a number of mathematical methods do 
exist for proving a computer program satisfi es a 
formal specifi cation of its behaviour.
As development moves towards higher levels 
of autonomy then the need for stronger, formal 
software verifi cation becomes acute. One of the 
fundamental steps that needs to be taken to 
understand and analyse HAVs is that we must 
assess not just what a system will do, but why 
it chooses to do it.7 This, together with the 
need for explainability and responsibility leads 
towards systems with an identifi able central 
decision-making software component and, in 
this case, the formal verifi cation of this software 
component can ensure that its decision-
making is correct and allows us to analyse the 
decisions an autonomous system makes against 
the decisions that a human driver should take. 
In complementary work, in aerospace8, it is 
formally verifi ed that an autonomous (air) vehicle 
always follows (selected) “Rules of the Air”. 
In the past 2-3 years, work has also started 
on how formal verifi cation methods could be 
applied to making the problem of verifying 
HAVs easier. For example, by understanding and 
formalizing specifi c desired granular driving 
behaviours and checking by conventional means 
that any SUT can be verifi ed to satisfy those 
granular behavior requirements, the goal would 
be to eliminate collisions by design. Two notable 
contributions have come from TU Munich 
and MobilEye respectively as fi rst attempts at 
producing a formal mathematical model for 
acceptable driving behavior, using a concept of 
measuring and determining blame in the case of 
a collision.9, 10
These are useful contributions to the 
process of HAV verifi cation but the work so 
far is insuffi cient, not least in that proposed 
formulation for defi ning blame-free behaviour as 
set out in the most recent paper (for example 
in the presence of a child playing near parked 
cars) would imply a vehicle speed of just 10-15 
mph, yet humans can and do drive safely at 20-
25mph in the same scenarios. Work is needed to 
consider how those formulations can discover 
and capture the more complex processes that 
humans are using for driving, including the 
social norms, customs and behaviors that are an 
essential (locally specifi c) element of the safe 
driving in mixed human/HAV environments.
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New Type Approval Process
The current Whole Vehicle Type Approval is 
well-suited to the present model where those 
component, system and vehicle specifi cations 
can be well-defi ned, stable, recorded, tested 
and approved.
But this process is clearly inadequate for HAVs, 
because:
• Many requirements will be highly specifi c to 
the ODD
• Requirements will change on a continuous 
basis as new vehicles, objects, behaviors, 
signage are emergent in the ODD over the life 
of the SUT and HAV
• There will always be a gap to the real-world 
requirements, necessitating a continuous 
process of requirements discovery through 
vehicle testing and/or live vehicle logging
• On discovery of a failure, HAV technology 
developers will be obligated to provide 
updated software and models to the 
vehicle and/or upgrade sensors, compute, 
communications technology or other AD 
capabilities and this could be very frequent 
and/or urgent
• Those updates, in improving performance on 
certain identifi ed failure modes, may cause 
unexpected regressions or changes in others
The safety risks from AD operation are very 
Components of a 
Highly Automated 
Vehicle Certifi cation 
Process
different to those being managed in the current 
Whole Vehicle Type Approval process and a new 
testing and certifi cation process is required.
To protect the public, improve road safety 
over time, assure public trust and ensure our 
economies and citizens reap the benefi ts of 
HAVs ahead of other developed economies:
• A new HAV Type Approval process must 
discover and establish a very high safety 
standard for the verifi cation and certifi cation 
of any SUT used on public roads in the UK 
and, if adopted, across the EU
• The certifi cation of HAV Type Approval, 
at least initially, must be specifi c to the 
requirements of a well-defi ned ODD and a 
well-defi ned DHC; those requirements must 
represent a complete specifi cation, following 
extensive discovery
• That high standard must be consistently 
applied to all HAVs seeking certifi cation for 
any ODD/DHC pair
• Each certifi cation of HAV Type Approval 
granted for any ODD/DHC pair must carry 
the obligation of Conformity of Production, 
meaning that all subsequent hardware and/
or software changes must not reduce the 
overall safety of the design measured against 
the then current and most complete ODD/
DHC requirements specifi cation; the meaning 
of overall safety in this context will need 
to be established, likely as a high threshold 
pass rate of a statistically signifi cant sample 
of regression and generative test cases in 
an ODD/DHC pair in full stack and motion 
planning simulation environments
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• Any request for a HAV to operate outside its 
ODD/DHC pair must be accompanied by a 
further certifi cation process for the changed 
ODD or DHC respectively
Practical Aspects of Validation, 
Verifi cation and Certifi cation
Scenario Sharing
As discussed, discovering scenarios that can 
inform safe system requirements for HAVs is 
expensive work spanning large scale, multi-
fi delity simulation as well as physical testbed 
and public road testing. Much like the expensive 
process of drug discovery, no commercial 
organization could incur the expense and take 
the commercial risk unless they were assured 
some preferential use of the resulting outputs, 
which in the case of drug molecule development 
and testing, is achieved through patent 
protection. For the organizations developing 
HAV technology, requirements discovery is a 
similarly huge investment but also a source of 
competitive advantage. 
Clearly a balance needs to be struck between 
sharing discovered requirements for the public 
good and that commercial imperative, without 
retreating to a legally enforceable patenting 
regime.  
We propose a model by which HAV technology 
developers are encouraged to share the 
scenarios they discover with the UK certifi cation 
authority (UKCA). Independent test houses 
would be commissioned by the UKCA and 
provided with controlled access to the scenarios 
for the purposes of evaluating HAV performance 
for both certifi cation and also on behalf of 
regulated UK insurers, where required:
 
• Submitted scenarios are evaluated by 
UKCA for possible acceptance into an ODD 
certifi cation test catalog, for example on the 
basis of probability in the target ODD or on 
the basis of more than one HAV technology 
developer executing the scenario and passing 
the test
• HAV technology developers can elect for 
submitted and accepted scenarios to be 
made public, but are not obligated to do so
• Any SUT for any target ODD must be tested 
in simulation by an independent test house 
against the full test catalog applicable for 
the ODD certifi cation (whether publicly 
visible or not)
• A publicly described test oracle will 
determine whether a test has passed or 
failed, based on an overall safety threshold 
set by the UKCA in which the probability of 
occurrence of each scenario for the target 
ODD must be evaluated
• Where a SUT fails a private scenario, 
abstracted feedback would be provided to 
the HAV technology developer of that SUT, 
e.g. SUT failed in interaction with a cyclist.
A process along these lines has the following 
advantages:
• All HAV technology developers are 
encouraged to submit scenarios for testing in 
order to raise the bar for competitors seeking 
certifi cation in an ODD
• Abstracted feedback from failed tests 
should encourage HAV technology vendors 
to generally improve their system safety 
performance rather than ‘gaming’ a solution 
to a specifi c scenario. However, the UKCA 
must ensure that vendors are not prevented 
from passing certifi cation by being required 
to pass highly unlikely scenarios for which 
they are not provided details 
• A market is created for non-competing HAV 
vendors, e.g. component suppliers or others, 
to fi nd and submit private scenarios which, 
once accepted by the approval body have in 
themselves a value which can be licensed 
to technology vendors seeking system 
certifi cation
• Independent test houses would not be 
subject to the same Freedom of Information 
(FOI) requests as a government body and 
could thus protect HAV technology vendors 
from being forced to disclose exhaustive 
details about their performance in relation to 
specifi c scenarios which could result in the 
disclosure of valuable trade secrets
Scenario Validation Process
The validation of submitted scenario candidates 
into an ODD test catalog that becomes 
mandatory is a process which must be 
developed.
Lessons can likely be drawn from other 
sectors which have successfully tackled 
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similar challenges of competitive technology 
development which must evolve standards and 
operate in a shared common environment.  
Cellular wireless telecommunications is perhaps 
a good example, where the establishment of 
a cross-industry body, the Global Certifi cation 
Forum (GCF) was established to defi ne the 
priority of different work items (in their case 
dependent on Mobile Network Operators’ 
deployment plans) and how to test conformance 
to relevant Third Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) wireless standards, such as 3G and LTE, 
so that the standard is met and there is a strong 
basis for expecting inter-operability between 
different networks and network equipment. 
GCF defi nes work items to prioritize specifi c 
test areas, working groups are drawn from 
industry participants to review those work 
items and to seek agreement on the ingredients 
of conformance test cases, pass criteria, 
parameters for simulation etc. and to be the fi nal 
determinant of formal adoption of test cases as 
part of the mandatory program to be certifi ed 
as GCF compliant by independent test houses. 
Obligatory test cases for each work item grow 
as standards are evolved and fi eld failures are 
identifi ed. In the example of 3G standards, the 
mandatory test program as a whole escalated 
quickly from tens of test cases to thousands 
of increasingly complex test cases over several 
quarters. In GCF’s case, for any new test case to 
be adopted, it must be shown to be reproducible 
and repeatable, which normally means that two 
separate test and measurement organizations 
must demonstrate the implementation and 
execution of the same test. Cellular wireless 
technology development has different market 
and technology dynamics (global standards, 
established test and measurement companies, 
already a highly competitive market, contained 
functionality, and not safety critical, etc.), so 
an exact read across to HAVs will not work, but 
adaptation of some of these ideas for certifying 
HAVs could be instructive.
Simulation and Test Tool Sharing
HAVs will ultimately operate over a wide range 
of real-world environments, some of which 
will be extremely complex with enormous 
possible state spaces and failure conditions to 
explore and verify. That leads to the conclusion 
that simulation must play a lead role in any 
effective testing procedure, in the generation 
of test conditions, in the parallelization and/
or faster than real-time scaling up needed in 
the measurement of test coverage and in the 
defect-seeking capabilities of the randomization 
testing. 
Closed course, physical testbed testing is one 
form of simulation that has a role to play in 
any meaningful testing regime. It serves an 
important purpose in that a real HAV’s full stack 
response is measured with hardware in-the-loop 
within a full physical environment that has been 
designed to stress known specifi c risk aspects 
of the system and can not only identify system 
defects against those specifi c scenarios but can 
also pinpoint simulation modelling defects and 
gaps to the real world.
However, the dominant focus of any robust 
certifi cation process should rest on system 
verifi cation using high-fi delity software 
simulation at hyper-scale across a vast number 
of permutations and combinations. Moreover, 
this process must leverage tools to explore 
state space and seek defects, such as fuzzing 
and directed random testing as well as replaying 
regression suites of curated scenarios.
Engaging private enterprises in developing 
and contributing to the development and 
operation of this certifi cation process is a real 
consideration, particularly in relation to parties 
who do not themselves plan to be operators of 
HAVs in the target ODDs, as may be the case for 
some HAV technology developers. Even in these 
cases, there may be a preference for reserving 
tools and models as trade secrets over sharing 
their utility across the industry as a whole.
Governments therefore may have an important 
role to play in enabling a market to exist for the 
licensing of tools or for their commercial use by 
practising entities. The objective needs to be to 
ensure that development expenses required for 
necessary and valuable independent simulation 
and tools are capable of being leveraged into 
meaningful revenue streams by technology 
developers. One means of achieving this would 
be for government to signal and enable a 
market for such tools to be created, for example 
through the UKCA or to sponsor a cross-industry 
unit to step up to the important task, one 





The behavior of SUT for HAVs will exhibit non-
determinism in the sense that if we repeat 
what is an identical test execution with what 
we believe to be an identical opening state, we 
might still get a different system behaviour. This 
non-determinism may be a result of e.g. random 
noise injection, race conditions, or some other 
aspects of operating system performance.
Therefore, in order to build confi dence in 
system performance, an effective verifi cation 
program may need to run a single test case 
multiple times. Where possible, that program 
must eventually reason about the number 
of test executions necessary to achieve a 
defi ned confi dence level in the results, using 
probabilistic arguments. 
Where possible, however, the industry should 
seek to build tools that offer repeatability and 
possibly even random stability to ensure that 
defects can be re-found and corrective actions 
can be proven to have been effective.
  
Test Oracle
A test oracle is a mechanism for determining 
whether a system has passed or failed a test and 
usually is comprised of three capabilities:
• A generator, to provide predicted or expected 
results for each test
• A comparator, to compare predicted and 
obtained results
• An evaluator, to determine whether the 
comparison results are suffi ciently close to 
be a pass
Any of the oracle capabilities may be automated 
and an automated test oracle will be required 
to generate, compare and evaluate the 
performance of the SUT across the test scenario 
catalog, and perhaps in a fully generative 
model within the ODD constraints, to ultimately 
determine if the system performed acceptably 
given the certifi cation criteria.
The generator should make use of the DHC as 
extended and the comparator should compare 
the SUT results against the desired DHC and 
safety outturns. Evaluation is signifi cantly more 
complex than simply determining if the SUT 
was involved in a collision since at one extreme 
bad driving behaviour doesn’t always result in 
a collision and at the other, a collision is the 
safest choice for a given set of circumstances.
The specifi cation for the test oracle should be 
made available to HAV technology developers 
seeking certifi cation.
Conformity of Production (CoP) Audit
Conformity of Production (CoP) is a means of 
evidencing the ability to produce a series of 
products that exactly match the specifi cation, 
performance and marking requirements outlined 
in the type approval documentation. 
In the context of HAVs and a new certifi cation 
process, HAV technology developers will need 
to provide evidence to the satisfaction of UKCA 
that the HAV SUT is representative of all of that 
Type and that the process of developing and 
deploying design changes is robust. The form of 
evidence will need to be carefully considered but 
could follow the lines of a process review.
The International Automotive Task Force (IATF) 
together with the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) has developed a standard, 
IATF16949:2016.11 This defi nes the quality 
management system requirements for the design 
and development, production, installation and 
service of automotive-related products. 
To achieve IATF certifi cation, an automotive 
supplier has to work according to automotive 
core tools, such as:
 
• Advanced Product Quality Planning – a 
structured approach to the design and 
development of products and processes 
• Production Part Approval Process – formal 
release by the customer of a supplier’s 
product and process 
• Failure Mode Effect Analysis – risk analysis 
tool in which a supplier analyses the major 
risks of not fulfi lling the required functions in 
the current design or process
• Measurement System Analysis – evaluation 
of the reliability of the measurement systems 
used by a supplier in its process
• Statistical Process Control – a method 
of quality control which uses statistical 
methods to monitor and control a process
• 8D Problem Solving – structural approach 
to analyze problems, including root causes 
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analysis, containment and corrective 
actions12
Since IATF16949:2016 contains all the key 
elements for a QMS and is already centered on 
automotive applications, it is a strong candidate 





Recent promising research at TU Darmstadt 
has centered on applying a technique known as 
the Swiss Cheese Model to HAV verifi cation for 
assessing the probability of collision. In essence, 
each sensing modality, process, behavioral or 
environmental variable has ‘holes’ which could 
permit a failure and when those holes line up, 
a collision can occur. One of the key unknowns 
for assessing the safety of HAVs versus human 
drivers is a strong understanding of the gap 
between the probability of critical situations 
arising in driving scenarios and probability that 
those critical situations do actually result in a 
collision. In human driven cars, this difference is 
a representation of the driving skill and attention 
of the driver themselves. But on replacing the 
human with the SUT, those human failure modes 
(which could be inattention, blind spots etc.) 
are replaced with new failure modes (which 
could be detection and classifi cation accuracy, 
prediction failures etc.). The replacement of one 
set of cheese slices with another can exhibit 
quite different failures which demands further 
research.13
Quantifying and measuring these impacts has 
the potential for us to measure the probability of 
collision and to compare the two in quantifi able 




In another initiative, this time from a research 
team at Volvo Cars, studies into the use of near-
collision measurement as a means of estimating 
the frequency of actual collisions show good 
promise. Their approach uses a technique called 
Extreme Value Theory but more importantly 
highlights the need for further research into 
capturing and using near collision data for 
robust collision rate estimation.14
These ideas, and many others, should be 
reviewed and considered for the on-going 
development of HAV validation, verifi cation and 
certifi cation processes.
Remaining Research Questions
Key research questions remain, and industry 
participants can and should work together with 
leading academics in UK and EU to address 
them, including:
• What machine learning methods should 
be applied to directed random testing in 
coverage driven verifi cation?
• Given the high dimensionality of the 
test space, what coverage measures are 
meaningful in generative and ODD digital 
twin verifi cation?
• Which computer vision methods can 
we apply to the 3D reconstruction and 
annotation of digital twin worlds from 
photogrammetry, Lidar scans and other 
sensing modalities that mean accurate, up-
to-date digital twins are feasible? 
• What hardware acceleration beyond GPUs 
can we design and apply to enable real-
time and faster-than-real-time full stack 
verifi cation of HAVs?
• How can we apply formal software checking 
to the complex integrated systems required 
for autonomous driving to ensure that each 
build achieves its goals without bugs or 
gaps?
• How do we really apply formal mathematical 
methods to fully express the DHC, vehicle 
dynamics and other road user expectations 
and behaviors to allow us to verify the 
behavioral safety of HAVs?
• How can we verify HAV systems that 
comprise of one or more end-to-end neural 
networks with the requirements to explain 
failure modes and take corrective actions 
to improve their performance using human 
readability and intermediate outputs of 
modular processes?
• How might we extrapolate randomized 
testing, including near collisions, into a 
measure of probability of collision generally?
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This paper makes a number of suggestions that 
fall into the realm of policy making, including:
• Could a validation, verifi cation and 
certifi cation system, such as that outlined 
in this paper, that incentivizes sharing of 
scenarios while protecting the value intrinsic 
to their discovery, improve safety across the 
industry? Could it be used by an approval 
body such as UKCA to establish a high 
standard for UK certifi cation?
• Can the industry agree on a scenario 
description language that supports coverage-
driven verifi cation and is extensible? Is 
Pegasus a suitable basis for extension to 
meet this?
• What should the specifi cation of an 
appropriate simulation environment be and 
would the government request to tender for 
delivery of such a tool?
• Could the specifi cation for a test oracle 
be made available and could this be based 
on a formal description of ‘good driving’ in 
accordance with a DHC?
• Is auditable adherence to the IATF16949:2016 
quality assurance process suffi cient to 
satisfy ‘Conformity of Production’?
Questions for Policy 
Makers
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A number of different methods must be 
combined for the robust certifi cation of HAVs for 
deployment in ODDs in the United Kingdom and, 
by extension, other jurisdictions in Europe.  
At the centre of this process is hyper-scale 
fuzzed scenario-based testing and the use 
of coverage driven verifi cation methods in 
digital twins of the ODD and using generative 
models representative of each ODD. Testing 
must cover both full stack testing, which will 
require photo-realistic and sensor-realistic 
rendering of scenarios and objects, together 
with accurate sensor modelling and motion 
planning stack testing, which will require robust 
beliefs over actor behaviors to test predictive, 
planning and motion synthesis capabilities. 
A method for sharing scenarios to a UKCA for 
industry-wide testing will be required and a 
means of balancing that sharing for the public 
good with the need to retain economic leverage 
over the necessary costs of discovering those 
requirements will need to be devised. A DHC to 
include good driving behaviors will be needed 
and a test oracle will be required to evaluate and 





Philip Koopman is an Associate Professor at 
the Carnegie Mellon University Electrical and 
Computer Engineering Department. Additionally, 
he is the Embedded & Reliable Information 
System thrust leader at the CMU Institute for 
Complex Engineered Systems, the Dependable 
Embedded System thrust leader for the CMU/
General Motors collaborative research laboratory, 
and a courtesy faculty member of the Institute 
for Software Research, International (ISRI).
Koopman received a Ph.D. in Computer 
Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University in 
1989 and both a M.Eng. and B.S. in Computer 
and Systems Engineering from Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute in 1982.
Professor Robert Hierons
Brunel University London
Rob Hierons received a BA in Mathematics 
(Trinity College, Cambridge), and a Ph.D. in 
Computer Science (Brunel University London). 
He then joined the Department of Mathematical 
and Computing Sciences at Goldsmiths College, 
University of London, as a lecturer in computer 
science before returning to Brunel University 
London. He is a member of the Brunel Software 
Contributor 
biographies
Engineering Lab (BSEL) and is the Director of 
one of Brunel\s University Research Centres: the 
Centre for Software and Systems. He has chaired 
or co-chaired several events including the 16th 
IFIP TC 6 / WG 6.1 International Conference on 
Testing of Communicating Systems (TestCom 
2004), the fi rst IEEE International Conference 
on Software Testing, Verifi cation and Validation, 
ICST 2008, the 11th International Conference 
On Quality Software (QSIC 2011), and the 
11th International Conference on Software 
Engineering and Formal Methods (SEFM 2013). 
He chairs the steering committee of the IFIP TC 
6 / WG 6.1 International Conference on Testing 
Software and Systems (ICTSS). Hierons is also 
the joint Editor of The Journal of Software 
Testing, Verifi cation and Reliability.
Siddartha Khastgir
University of Warwick
Siddartha Khastgir is currently a Principal 
Engineer at WMG, University Warwick and the 
research lead for Verifi cation and Validation 
of Connected and Autonomous Vehicle 
technologies. A Chartered Engineer, Siddartha 
has already achieved considerable success in the 
automotive industry. Recently, he was recognised 
in the prestigious Forbes 30 Under 30 Europe 
2018 – Industry list for this applied research. 
After his undergraduate at IIT Kharagpur (India), 
(including a period as a research intern in UK 
and Germany), he worked for 4 years in the 
industry on advanced control technology, fi rst 
with Tata Motors (India) and then with FEV 
(Germany) and has led multi-cultural teams 
22
in delivering mass production product project 
teams. He has received numerous awards for 
research contributions which have delivered 
impact to the automotive industry both 
nationally and internationally.
He represents the UK on the ISO Technical 
Committee (ISO TC 204 WG14) and is a member 
of an international team of experts, creating 
international standards for safe introduction of 
automated vehicles. He is the lead author of a 
new international (ISO) standard on Low-Speed 
Automated Driving (LSAD) systems. He is also a 
member of the SAE Task Force on STPA which 
is creating a Recommended Practice for using 
STPA (a systems engineering method to identify 
hazards) in the automotive industry.
Professor John A Clark
University of Sheffi eld
John Clark is Professor of Computer and 
Information Security at the University of 
Sheffi eld since April 2017 and leads the Security 
of Advanced Systems Research Group (which 
specializes in the application of AI to security). 
Previously he was Professor of Critical Systems 
at the University of York, having joined academia 
in 1992 as a Lecturer in Safety Critical Systems. 
Over 2013-2017 he was a Royal Society Wolfson  
Research Merit Award holder. He studied 
Mathematics and then Applied Statistics at 
Oxford, before joining the security division of 
the software and systems house Logica (where 
he worked on security evaluation and security 
R&D). Clark leads Pitch-In, Research England's 
Connecting Capabilities Fund project, which 
aims to enhance innovation and the impact of 




Michael Fisher is a Professor in the Department 
of Computer Science at the University of 
Liverpool, and Director of the University's Centre 
for Autonomous Systems Technology. He is a 
Fellow of both the BCS and the IET, member 
of the BSI AMT/10 committee on Robotics and 
the IEEE P7009 Standard for Fail-Safe Design of 
Autonomous Systems and lead the UK Network 




Rob Alexander is a Lecturer in the High 
Integrity Systems Engineering (HISE) group in 
the Department of Computer Science at the 
University of York. His main research area is 
automated testing, with a particular focus in the 
safety and security validation of autonomous 
robots. He is currently supervising research 
projects on mutation testing in model-driven 
engineering, justifying the dependability of safety 
decision support systems, and automated robot 
testing using simulation and metaheuristic 
search. Alexander is chair of the Safety Critical 





Kerstin Eder is Professor of Computer 
Science and heads the Trustworthy Systems 
Laboratory at the University of Bristol. She is an 
internationally recognized expert specializing 
in analysis, verifi cation and validation of 
complex systems with respect to functional 
correctness, safety, performance and energy 
effi ciency. Eder has gained extensive experience 
of verifying complex microelectronic designs 
while working with leading semiconductor 
design and Electronic Design Automation 
companies worldwide. In her research she 
seeks novel techniques to achieve solutions 
that make a difference in practice. Her most 
recent contributions include intelligent, agent-
based testing of code for robots that directly 
interact with humans, using assertion checks 
and theorem proving to verify control system 
designs, energy modeling of software and energy 
transparency through static analysis to predict 
energy consumption of programs. Eder leads 
the Verifi cation and Validation for Safety in 
Robots research theme at the Bristol Robotics 
Laboratory (http://www.brl.ac.uk/vv). Her 
research benefi ts from strong, well-established 
links with industry evidenced through direct 
industrial funding and numerous research 
collaborations, most recently focusing on safety 
verifi cation for learning machines. 
Eder has co-authored over 60 internationally 
23
refereed publications, serves on the Programme 
Committees of several leading international 
verifi cation conferences, such as the ACM Design 
Automation Conference and the International 
Conference on Computer Aided Verifi cation, 
regularly works as expert reviewer for the EC and 
was awarded a Royal Academy of Engineering 
‘Excellence in Engineering’ prize in 2007. She 
holds a PhD in Computational Logic, an MSc in 
Artifi cial Intelligence and an MEng in Informatics.
Professor Pete Thomas
University of Loughborough
Pete Thomas is the Professor of Road and 
Vehicle Safety at Loughborough University where 
there is a team of over 20 people who conduct 
research to develop new road and vehicle safety 
measures and to evaluate the performance 
in the real-world. He joined Loughborough 
University in 1982 in order to establish what 
was then the Accident Research Unit. The group 
expanded to become a team of over 30 people 
before being disbanded in 2014. The team was 
awarded the prestigious Queen’s Anniversary 
Prize in 2007 for its work and in 2013 it received 
the Prince Michael of Kent International Road 
Safety Award for its work on the European Road 
Safety Observatory.
Thomas is a leading fi gure in the development 
of road and vehicle safety policy resources and 
has led the establishment of the European Road 
Safety Observatory.
Dr Geoff Barrett 
Geoff Barrett graduated from Oxford University 
with a DPhil in formal verifi cation in 1988. 
He worked for STMicro for 10 years where 
he spent much time implementing model 
checkers and formal equivalence checkers. He 
joined Element14 in 1999 where he founded 
the verifi cation team and was Verisity’s fi rst 
European customer. Since E14 was acquired by 
Broadcom, Geoff has developed a unifi ed chip 
verifi cation environment which is used across 
the Broadband Communications Group. Barrett 
now runs Broadcom’s FirePath DSP processor 
development programme and chairs NMI’s 
Microelectronics Design Advisory Board.
Professor Philip Torr
University of Oxford and FiveAI
Philip Torr serves as FiveAI’s chief scientifi c 
advisor. Professor Torr leads the University of 
Oxford’s Torr Vision group, a global, state-of-the-
art research team comprising 25 post-doctoral 
and PhD students doing pioneering work in the 
fi eld of machine learning for computer vision.
After achieving his PhD in the fi eld of computer 
vision at the University of Oxford, Torr’s career 
includes pioneering work in computer vision at 
Microsoft Research both in Redmond, WA and 
Cambridge, UK before returning to academia at 
the University of Oxford. His work covers fi elds 
such as object recognition, 3D reconstruction, 
tracking, and scene understanding and attracts 
the highest honors in the fi eld of computer 
vision, including the biennial ICCV Marr Prize. 
Torr is regularly awarded top paper status at the 
most prestigious computer vision conferences 
including IEEE CVPR, ECCV, ICCV and BMVC, as 




Andrew Blake is a scientifi c advisor to FiveAI. 
Andrew was the fi rst Institute Director of The 
Alan Turing Institute. He is an Honorary Professor 
in Information Engineering at the University of 
Cambridge, and a leading researcher in computer 
vision.
He studied Mathematics and Electrical Sciences 
at Trinity College, Cambridge and after a year 
as a Kennedy Scholar at MIT and time in the 
electronics industry, he completed a PhD 
in Artifi cial Intelligence at the University of 
Edinburgh in 1983. Serving next on the faculty of 
the Computer Science Department in Edinburgh, 
he developed early variational approaches and 
optimisation algorithms for image processing. 
On the faculty of Engineering Science of Oxford 
University, subsequently as Professor, he 
pioneered a probabilistic approach to algorithms 
that enables computers to behave as seeing 
machines. In 1999 he moved to Microsoft 
Research in Cambridge to found the Computer 
Vision Group which developed algorithms for 
image processing and 3D vision underlying 
several Microsoft technologies. In 2010 he 
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became Laboratory Director at Microsoft, was 
appointed to the council of the Royal Society, 
and to the council of the Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) 
in 2012. He holds honorary doctorates at the 
Universities of Edinburgh and Sheffi eld.
Blake was elected Fellow of the Royal Academy 
of Engineering in 1998 and Fellow of the Royal 
Society in 2005. He won jointly the IEEE David 
Marr Prize in 2001, and in 2006 the Royal 
Academy of Engineering awarded him its Silver 
Medal for ‘technical achievements in visual 
segmentation and motion tracking’. In 2007 he 
received the IET Mountbatten Medal (previously 
awarded to computing pioneers Maurice Wilkes 
and Tim Berners-Lee, amongst others) and the 
IEEE Distinguished Researcher award for ‘major 
research contributions in Computer Vision’ 
in 2009. In 2011 his computer vision team at 
Microsoft were awarded the Royal Academy of 
Engineering MacRobert Gold medal for their 
work on the machine learning algorithms in the 
Kinect 3D camera, which has subsequently sold 
in the tens of millions. In 2014, Andrew gave the 
87th Gibbs lecture of the American Mathematical 
Society on ‘Machines that see, powered by 
probability’.
Dr Subramanian Ramamoorthy
University of Edinburgh and FiveAI
Subramanian Ramamoorthy is a scientifi c advisor 
to FiveAI. Ramamoorthy is a Reader in Robotics 
in the School of Informatics at The University 
of Edinburgh, where he is affi liated with the 
Institute of Perception, Action and Behaviour. 
He is an Executive Committee Member of the 
Edinburgh Centre for Robotics, a Coordinator 
of the EPSRC Robotarium Research Facility 
and Research Theme Leader for Cyber-Physical 
Systems in the Scottish Informatics and 
Computer Science Alliance. Previously, he spent 
several years at National Instruments Corp., 
in the control design, dynamic simulation and 
computer vision research groups, contributing to 
the development of fi ve software products and 
seven US patents.
He received his PhD in Electrical and Computer 
Engineering from the University of Texas at 
Austin in 2007. In work started at Austin and 
subsequently developed during his tenure at 
Edinburgh, recognised by several best paper 
award nominations, he pioneered an approach 
to motion synthesis and safe task encoding 
based on the use of geometric and topological 
abstractions. Ramamoorthy leads the Robust 
Autonomy and Decisions research group, whose 
current focus is on techniques for compositional, 
incremental learning of structured models and 
interactive decision-making, enabling robots 
to rapidly adapt to complex and dynamic 
environments.
Ramamoorthy is an Elected Member of the 
Young Academy of Scotland at the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh, and has held Visiting 
Professor positions at the University of Rome “La 
Sapienza” and Stanford University.
Professor John McDermid
University of York and FiveAI
John McDermid became Professor of Software 
Engineering at the University of York in 1987. He 
set up the High Integrity Systems Engineering 
(HISE) research group in the Department of 
Computer Science, which has become the 
largest academic research group focusing on 
safety critical systems. He was Head of the 
Department from 2006 to 2012 and from 2016 to 
2017, and was University Research Champion
for Risk, Evidence and Decision-making from 
2015 to 2018.
His research covers a broad range of issues 
in systems, software and safety engineering 
focusing on safety of complex computer-
controlled systems. He initiated the work on the 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) that has become 
the most widely used method for structuring 
safety cases. He has run several major research 
centres for industry, including BAE Systems and 
Rolls-Royce. In January 2018 he became
the Director of the £10M, 5-year Lloyd’s 
Register Foundation funded Assuring Autonomy 
International Programme, which focuses on 
the assurance and regulatory issues relating 
to robotics and autonomous systems. His 
research has shaped industrial practice, e.g. 
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by developing novel techniques for assessing 
the safety of the M42 “intelligent highway”, and 
through contribution to standards. He is author 
or editor of six books and has published about 
400 papers.
McDermid has advised companies and 
government departments on several continents, 
e.g. advising the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) on software safety, advising 
Siemens Corporate on agile development 
methods for safety critical software, and 
reviewing safety management in the UK Defence 
maritime sector. He was a member of the UK 
MoD Defence Scientifi c Advisory Council for 
nearly ten years, and has advised Rolls-Royce 
on systems and software engineering since the 
late 1990s. He was appointed a safety advisor to 
FiveAI in 2018. He was elected a Fellow of the 
Royal Academy of Engineering in 2002 and was 
awarded an OBE in the 2010 New Year’s
Honours list.
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The specifi c conditions under which a given 
driving automation system or feature thereof 
is designed to function, including, but not 
limited to, driving modes is known as the 
ODD, in accordance with SAE J 3016
“Even if the safety of autonomous vehicles 
is low—hundreds of failures per 100 million 
miles, which is akin to human-driven injury 
and crash rates—demonstrating this would 
take tens or even hundreds of millions of 
miles, depending on the desired precision.”
Kalra, Nidhi and Susan M. Paddock, Driving 
to Safety: How Many Miles of Driving 
Would It Take to Demonstrate Autonomous 
Vehicle Reliability?. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR1478.html
Number of motor insurance claims notifi ed* 
in the United Kingdom (UK) from 2010 to 
2016 (in millions), Statista 2018
http://www.pegasus-projekt.info/en/
Huang X., Kwiatkowska M., Wang S., Wu M. 
(2017) Safety Verifi cation of Deep Neural 
Networks. In: Majumdar R., Kunčak V. (eds) 
Computer Aided Verifi cation. CAV 2017. 








Monitor/actuator pair architectures can 
be used in-vehicle to separate the most 
complex autonomy functions from simpler 
safety functions. The primary AV functions 
are performed by the high complexity 
‘actuator’ system, and a paired module 
(the ‘monitor’) performs an acceptance 
test / behavioural validation. The low 
complexity monitor system should be more 
straightforward to verify and therefore could, 
potentially, be verifi ed to ISO 26262 ASIL-D
Fisher, Dennis, Webster: Verifying 
Autonomous Systems. Communications of 
the ACM 56(9):84-93, 2013. http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/2494558
Webster, Cameron, Fisher, Jump: Generating 
Certifi cation Evidence for Autonomous 
Unmanned Aircraft Using Model Checking and 
Simulation. J. Aerospace Inf. Sys. 11(5):258-
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Rizaldi, A., & Althoff, M. (2015, September). 
Formalising traffi c rules for accountability 
of autonomous vehicles. In Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITSC), 2015 IEEE 
18th International Conference on (pp. 1658-
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Shalev-Shwartz, S., Shammah, S., & Shashua, 
A. (2017). On a Formal Model of Safe and 
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